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PAPER
Using stem cell-derived gametes for same-sex
reproduction: an alternative scenario
Seppe Segers,1 Heidi Mertes,1 Guido Pennings,1 Guido de Wert,2 Wybo Dondorp2
ABSTRACT
It has been suggested that future application of stem-cell
derived gametes (SCD-gametes) might lead to the
possibility for same-sex couples to have genetically
related children. Still, for this to become possible, the
technique of gamete derivation and techniques of
reprogramming somatic cells to a pluripotent state
(directly or via somatic cell nuclear transfer) would have
to be perfected. Moreover, egg cells would have to be
derived from male cells and sperm cells from female
cells, which is believed to be particularly difficult, if not
impossible. We suggest a more plausible scenario to
provide same-sex couples with the possibility to parent a
child who is genetically related to both parents.
Although technical feasibility is an advantage (also in
terms of safety), disadvantages are that cooperation of a
donor of the opposite sex is still required and that the
partners are genetically linked to the resulting child in a
different degree. However, since in our scenario the
donor’s genetic contribution would not outweigh any of
the parents’ genetic contribution, this alternative route
may ease the fear for a possible parental claim by the
donor. Like many other applications in the field of
infertility treatment, the goal to create SCD-gametes for
reproductive purposes is largely based on the high value
attributed to genetic parenthood. Although we believe
that genetic relatedness is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for ‘good’ parenthood, we do believe
that many people may consider our scenario a welcome
alternative.
INTRODUCTION
The normative ideal of ‘normal’ parenthood
requires that both partners contribute 50% of the
child’s genes. Through the years, scientific efforts
have been made to assist people in reaching this
ideal. Several examples from the field of infertility
treatment illustrate how genetics serves as a criter-
ion for attributing parenthood.1 2 Treatments
which lead to (partially) unrelated offspring are
considered second best to services which do estab-
lish a genetic link, even if those services are riskier
and more costly. The creation of patient-specific
stem cell-derived gametes (SCD-gametes) for repro-
ductive purposes is one of the most recent steps in
this direction. It is believed that SCD-gametes may
create opportunities for heterosexual couples who
are biologically unable to have genetically related
children as well as for same-sex couples who desire
to parent a genetically related child. Currently, the
closest same-sex couples can come to shared
genetic parenthood, is via ‘symbolic gestures’, such
as reception of oocytes from partner, or
intrafamilial gamete donation to establish a genetic
link with the child.1 3–6 In theory, lesbian couples
could also consider mitochondrial replacement so
that one mother provides the nuclear DNA and the
other the mitochondrial DNA.7
It has been suggested that SCD-gametes may
provide an emancipatory outcome as a route to
‘full genetic parenthood’.8 If it would become pos-
sible to generate oocytes from men, and sperm
from women, same-sex couples would be able to
have offspring that is genetically related to both
parents: the ‘derived’ gamete from one partner
could be combined with the ‘natural’ gamete of the
other partner. If clinically available, it would be
unjust to exclude same-sex couples from using this
technology based on their sexual orientation, or
because it would be ‘unnatural’. Fears about the
welfare of children parented by same-sex couples
are ungrounded,3 and the natural as such is morally
neutral, so labelling something as ‘unnatural’ is not
a convincing moral argument.
It is, however, contested whether it will be pos-
sible to produce gametes from the opposite sex and
thus for same-sex couples to parent a child to
which each partner makes an equal genetic contri-
bution. Especially the possibility of deriving male
gametes from female cells is heavily contested (see
below). Also, even if technically possible, this pro-
cedure would require more extensive manipulations
than ‘regular’ gamete derivation from stem cells
and thus holds even more risks for the welfare of
the future offspring (see below).
We believe that same-sex couples are being given
false hope about the prospect of being able to
create a child who shares 50% of its DNA with
both partners. However, if genetic relatedness
(sharing a substantial amount of (nuclear) DNA,
but not 50%) and legitimacy as a parent are sought,
rather than ‘full genetic parenthood’ (sharing 50%
of DNA), SCD-gametes might be ready for the
clinic sooner for same-sex couples than for hetero-
sexual couples. In this paper, we describe a more
practical alternative for same-sex couples to con-
ceive a child that shares 50% of DNA with one
partner, 25% with the other partner and 25% with
a donor, without the necessity of producing
‘patient-matched’ pluripotent stem cells or deriving
male gametes from female cells or vice versa.
We explore the possibility of ‘full’ genetic parent-
hood for both same-sex parents, followed by the
alternative scenario which we primarily elaborate as
a possibility for lesbian couples. It is important to
note that—as Mertes has previously argued—the
entire enterprise of gamete derivation to establish
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genetic parenthood reinforces the importance accorded to
genetic relatedness, thus strengthening the very ‘problem’ that it
is meant to solve.9 It can be asked if, instead of considering
solutions including the alternative described here, it would not
be better to fundamentally question the importance of a genetic
link for family building as well as the use of sophisticated forms
of medically assisted reproduction as a means to providing that
link. Although we sympathise with this perspective, the prefer-
ence for a genetically related child seems too much a matter
both of evolutionary biology and culture to think it is realistic
to expect that it can simply be set aside as a result of rational
debate. Inevitably, this means that would-be parents including
same-sex couples will have to make their reproductive decisions
in a context where genetic relatedness is regarded as important,
and where the lack of it has direct implications. This may, for
instance, induce the idea that because of the genetic link with
the child a greater parental status could be attributed to the
donor than to the non-genetically related parent (both by the
child, the social parent and the donor), which could raise fears
that the donor might intervene in the family. We wish to
describe our scenario as a possible alternative and to initiate
ethical debate about it.
SCD-GAMETES
Several pathways have been explored to obtain SCD-gametes,
but most of the attention has gone to gamete derivation from
embryonic stem cells (ESCs) and from induced pluripotent stem
cells (iPSCs). ESCs derived from the inner cell mass of blasto-
cysts have the ability to differentiate into all body cells, includ-
ing into germ cells.8 When ESC-derived gametes are to be used
for reproduction leading to full genetic parenthood, this would
require the creation (and destruction) of an embryo through
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). Alternatively,
iPSC-derived gametes avoid the use of embryos. By reprogram-
ming somatic cells, iPSCs can be obtained which may then be
differentiated into gametes.
According to Easley et al,10 however, SCD-gametes are still
‘far from any direct clinical application’. Although Hendriks
et al8 believe that these studies ‘seem to be progressing steadily
towards possible future clinical application’, they underline that
the current findings are still preliminary and that overall effi-
ciency has to be considerably improved. Obstacles such as the
epigenetic stability of the SCD-gametes and concerns about the
health of future offspring have to be overcome if SCD-gametes
are to be used for infertility treatment.8 11 Moreover, to
produce patient-specific gametes, the technique of deriving
iPSCs or that of SCNT would have to be improved.2 There is
ongoing discussion about possible tumorigenicity of iPSCs as
well as about increased risks for accumulation of chromosomal
aneuploidies.11 There is also no consensus about reprogram-
ming and validation methods to obtain iPSCs.12 SCNT, on the
other hand, is regarded as a more efficient technique, although
it is uncertain whether SCNT-ESCs are any better than iPSCs.13
As mentioned above, even more scepticism is directed
towards the potential use of SCD-gametes in same-sex repro-
duction, since this requires the production of sperm from
women and eggs from men. Little research has been directed
towards this goal and still less has been achieved.8 11 The
Hinxton Group concluded that it is ‘not likely in the future of
the science’ that SCD-gametes will be used in same-sex repro-
duction due to ‘significant if not insurmountable scientific bar-
riers’.14 They stated that it will be very difficult to derive usable
eggs from men and that due to biological and technical reasons
it may even be ‘impossible, to derive sperm that could be used
for reproduction from XX (chromosomally female) cells’.15
Thus, it is believed that lesbian couples will not be able to
benefit from this technology because no sperm can be generated
in the absence of paternally imprinted genes. This was the
reason to think of a more likely alternative, especially for
lesbian couples.
AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD
Due to technical challenges to derive gametes from the opposite
sex, the possibility for same-sex couples to parent a child who
shares 50% of her genes with both parents seems quite a long
way off. Instead, it might be more likely to derive gametes from
embryos that were created by fertilisation, rather than deriving
gametes from SCNT-ESCs or iPSCs. This route is presumably
less complicated and less risky. Zhou et al16 produced the first
generation of functional spermatids from murine ESCs, con-
forming to the ‘gold standards’ of in vitro-derived germ cells.
By means of intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), these
‘spermatid-like cells’ successfully fertilised oocytes, resulting in
viable, fertile offspring that gave birth to the next generation.16
These are promising results that may lead to interesting clinical
applications. For same-sex couples, this may yield the more real-
istic possibility to draw a donor into the process of obtaining
SCD-gametes to beget a child which is genetically related to
both partners. Consider the following scenario:
A lesbian couple, W1 and W2 share the wish to parent ‘their
own’, genetically related child. Suppose that it would be possible
to derive sperm from human ESCs. Through ICSI a ‘male’
embryo—E1—could be generated by combining W1’s oocytes
with the sperm of a genetically unrelated donor, D. E1 shares a
50% genetic linkage with W1 and with D. ESCs could be derived
from E1 and differentiated into sperm cells. This sperm could
then be used to fertilize an oocyte of W2. The resulting embryo,
E2, would then share 50% of its genes with W2 and 50% with
E1, which on its part has a 50% genetic relatedness to both bio-
logical progenitors W1 and D. This would still make E2 genetic-
ally related to D for an average of 25%, and as much to its future
mother W1. A similar scenario would be possible for two male
partners, although then surrogacy is required.
This situation is similar to cases in which W2 would be inse-
minated by the brother of W1 in the sense that there would also
be an average 25% overlap in the genomes of W1 and the
resulting child. The difference is that in the case of intrafamilial
gamete donation, the donor has a much stronger genetic link to
the child (50%) than W1. The rationale behind intrafamilial
gamete donation often points back to the value attributed to
genetic relatedness.1 The underlying idea is that if it is impos-
sible to share 50% of one’s genes with a future child, then ‘25%
is better than nothing’.5 The fact that intrafamilial donation is
accepted, common and increasing suggests that people will be
interested in our scenario.17 It may thus be likely that lesbian
couples would be willing to engage in such a scenario. A further
reason for thinking this is that our scenario would be a better
alternative for those couples who value a genetic link with the
child for both partners and who would be weary of parental
claims by the donor.18 This scenario may generally avoid that
the donor will be attributed a greater parental status than the
non-genetically related parent (either by the child, W1 or the
donor himself ) on the basis of his genetic contribution. Since
the resulting child would inherit 25% of W1’s DNA, her status
would no longer be ‘limited’ to that of social mother, which
might comfort her fears to be sidelined by the donor.
Importantly, as parenthood is not limited to genetic contribu-
tion, W1’s intention to be a parent and her social role as a
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parent would rank her higher than D on the imaginary list of
candidate parents, although the genetic contribution of both W1
and D would be the same, namely about 25%.
Surprisingly, the described alternative has hardly received any
attention in the literature, although it is less futuristic than some
of the scenarios that have been suggested.19
BALANCING PROCREATIVE AUTONOMY AGAINST OTHER
INTERESTS
If we take the high value attributed to genetic parenthood as a
given, this alternative seems plausible for lesbian couples.
However, this premise is not uncontroversial. Our scenario may
be regarded as yet another instance of how the value attributed
to genetic parenthood leads to the development of new routes
to achieve it, which—in turn—reinforces the presumed import-
ance of genetic relatedness. Although we believe that having a
genetic relationship with one’s children is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for a good parental relationship, we
do not think that this settles the issue of the ethical acceptability
of our scenario.9 The issue is whether, against the background
of the de facto importance given in society to the genetic link,
the benefits that this scenario may have for lesbian couples are
proportionate to the ethical concerns it may also raise, including
the concern about ‘reinforcement’. This does not imply that
such reinforcement is unproblematic. However, denying
would-be lesbian parents the possibility to have genetically
related offspring—for whom this is important because of the
reason we discussed above—is not the way to bring about the
ideal of a society where genetic parenthood is not considered
superior. Also, if one considers the ‘reinforcement argument’ a
sufficient reason to dismiss our scenario, consistency requires
that one should also dismiss, say, ICSI for men when sperm
donation is available.
A second ethical concern is the controversial issue of sacri-
ficing E1 for the sake of genetic relatedness. Even if one does
not ascribe an absolute moral status to embryos, one need not
accept that embryos are being sacrificed for whichever purpose.
Particularly, the intentional creation and destruction of embryos
is regarded by many as disrespectful to human life and only per-
missible for exceptionally important causes. Only if one believes
that the creation of SCD-gametes for the sake of genetic related-
ness outweighs the cons of creating and destroying embryos, can
the discussed scenario be considered acceptable. By the same
token, the general venture to create patient-specific
SCD-gametes would be discredited, unless the iPSC route is per-
fected. It can also be argued that if embryo destruction is
accepted in the context of in vitro fertilisation (IVF), additional
reasons will be needed to deny this acceptability in the context
of reproduction via SCD-gametes. The related argument that it
would be unacceptable that E1 cannot consent to being a
gamete donor (hence genetic parent) is undermined by the fact
that E1 will not develop into an autonomous person, while
informed consent is meant to respect personal autonomy.
Third, although less complicated and likely safer than the
SCNTor iPSC routes, it is still an important prerequisite for any
application that the technology is safe. The level of techno-
logical intervention will always remain very high, which necessi-
tates thorough preclinical research prior to clinical use to
minimise safety risks. For two women, our scenario would
require (minimally, in case of 100% efficiency of all steps) two
cycles of ovarian stimulation, sperm donor recruitment and
sperm collection, two cycles of ICSI, of which one combined
with pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (to determine the sex of
the created embryos), ESC derivation, ESC line culturing, sperm
derivation from ESCs and embryo transfer. We leave it open for
discussion whether or not such a scenario is likely to ever meet
the requirements of good clinical practice due to the accumula-
tion of possible safety risks in each of these steps which have to
be weighed against the benefits of our scenario. The desirability
and acceptability of our scenario will depend substantially on
the point of reference that is adopted. Compared with the
speculative prospect of deriving female sperm or male oocytes
via induced pluripotency or SCNT, our scenario is safer and
more feasible, but the genetic link is weaker and a donor is still
involved. Compared with donor conception, our scenario is less
safe, less feasible, but the ‘second’ mother has a genetic link that
is as strong as the donor’s genetic link to the child.
There might also be psychological concerns: it may be a
source of discomfort for the resulting child to know that E1 had
to be destroyed for her to live, or because she has never known
E1, especially if this embryo is conceptualised as a ‘parent’.
20 21
Similar arguments have been used with regard to the possible
reproductive use of oocytes from aborted foetuses. Fact is that
we do not really know what the effects will be on the psycho-
logical well-being of the resulting offspring. It would be reason-
able not to exaggerate these concerns since similar concerns
from the past (eg, about IVF and donor conception) have not
been confirmed. Much will depend on how these new technolo-
gies are explained to the children and portrayed in the media.
In any case, it is not unique to the use of SCD-gametes that the
well-being of the future offspring is weighed against the parents’
desire for genetic parenthood.22
It has also been questioned whether genetic relatedness is
important enough to justify the use of costlier and more risky
techniques such as ICSI, mitochondrial donation and now
SCD-gametes.23 Indeed, a large part of the field of assisted
reproductive technology seems to be based on the self-evident
importance of a genetic link between a child and her parents
without questioning whether the effort of developing such tech-
niques is in proportion to the goal of having a genetically
related child.2 Given the context of finite resources, this should
involve considerations about just resource allocation and oppor-
tunity costs of investing in more urgent interventions. Again,
however, this concern is not unique to our scenario.
DO THE MEANS SERVE THE END?
If the goal of producing SCD-gametes is to establish genetic par-
enthood, we should deliberate whether or not this goal is
acceptable in view of the issues explored above, and we should
also critically assess whether or not the goal is reached at all. Do
SCD-gametes lead to genetic parenthood? People value the idea
of a child sharing the parents’ DNA, but the concept of genetic
parenthood is not limited to this criterion.9 If this were so, iden-
tical twins would be thought of as the parents of each other’s
children. Moreover, if a genetic link is important, then how
much would be enough? From the context of mitochondrial
donation, it may seem that a very tiny contribution of DNA
would be enough to be regarded as a genetic parent, since chil-
dren born following mitochondrial replacement are frequently
called ‘three-parent babies’.7 Reason for this is that they receive
nuclear DNA from the man and the woman, and mitochondrial
DNA from the oocyte donor, however limited it may be. Would
W1’s 25% genetic contribution—which is clearly larger than the
contribution of mitochondrial DNA—then be enough to make
her a genetic parent of E2? This will depend on whether a
broad or narrow definition of genetic parenthood is applied, but
a strong argument against would be that the progenitors with
whom we share an average of 25% of DNA in natural
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conception are grandparents, not parents. Also, despite being
‘not more than a ball of 150 cells’ E1 may thus be considered an
extra generation.20 Thus, if a narrow conception of genetic par-
enthood (sharing 50% of DNA) is adopted, then our scenario
does not reach its goal for W1, although it will establish a sub-
stantial genetic link with the future child.
However, establishing ‘full’ genetic parenthood may not be
the primary concern here. As mentioned earlier, the more
important goal may be to outrank other candidate parents and
thus increase the legitimacy as a parent. In our scenario, W1 is a
genetic progenitor of E2 and will be second on the imaginary
list of candidate parents (after W2, whose status as a parent is
incontestable). This position, together with her role as the social
parent, the intended parent and possibly as the gestational
mother considerably strengthens her parental role and will
comfort her fear to be sidelined by the donor. This substantial
benefit could contribute to the willingness to go to great lengths
to minimise the donor’s genetic contribution.
This is a good moral reason in favour of this scenario, but it
is not a sufficient argument for it to be pursued, given the safety
risks, the opportunity costs and the contested importance of
genetic parenthood. While genetic relatedness is highly valued
in parent–child relationships, endeavours to achieve it are
morally controversial (as this paper illustrates) and might, at the
same time, reinforce the dogma of genetic relatedness.
However, this reinforcement does not contradict that precisely
because of the strong societal emphasis on genetic relatedness,
lesbian couples who wish to parent a child have an interest in
minimising the genetic contribution by the donor as much as
possible. Thus, it may be reasonable to argue that our scenario
is proportionate to this interest, provided that it would be safe
and despite the fact that it inherently involves the creation and
destruction of embryos.
CONCLUSION
The value attributed to genetic parenthood, which may be
equally influenced by new reproductive technologies, leads to
new constructions to accommodate the pursuit of genetic par-
enthood. The alternative discussed here may be regarded as
such an example. On the one hand, we believe that genetic
relatedness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
‘good’ parenthood. On the other hand, we do realise that many
people prefer to pass on their DNA to their children and that
genetic parenthood is widely perceived as an uncontested form
of parenthood, and therefore renders legitimacy to the parental
role. Our scenario would therefore be a welcome alternative for
lesbian couples, since the donor’s genetic contribution would
not outweigh any of the mothers’ genetic contribution, which
would ease the fear of being sidelined by the donor. While our
scenario ‘only’ upholds the prospect of a 25% linkage, it is
nevertheless more realistic than other scenarios that have been
presented in the literature. It is plausible to assume that gamete
generation from human ESCs (as opposed to SCNT-ESCs
or iPSCs) will be the first step to clinical applications.
Thus—ironically—same-sex couples may benefit from SCD-
gametes before heterosexual couples do.
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